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The methodology for teaching trial advocacy to law students, young
attorneys, and experienced lawyers has remained unchanged for years.
Modeled after the approach of groups such as the National Institute
of Trial Advocacy (NITA),' and skills simulation programs in law schools
across the country, this traditional methodology is circumscribed by
a generally accepted set of characteristics. Students are presented with
a lecture or demonstration of a particular trial skill. These students
then attempt to accurately mimic the demonstrated skill. The student's
performance is followed by a critique, a verbal dissection of the student's
performance, often aided by a videotape review of that performance.2
Less commonly recognized in discussion of this method is that training
is conducted through use of written problem materials, trial-ready case
files, or short problem exercises employing multiple fact patterns.
t B.S. (1965), Cornell University; J.D. (1970), University of California at Berkeley (Boalt
Hall). Marilyn . Berger is currently a Professor of Law at University of Puget Sound School
of Law.
tt B.A. (1969), University of Wisconsin (Madison); J.D. (1970), Stanford University.
John B. Mitchell is a Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at University of Puget Sound School
of Law. The authors are grateful to Kari A. Robinson, senior law student at University of
Puget Sound School of Law, for her research assistance, and to Elizabeth Dorsett and Lori
Lamb for their invaluable assistance in word processing this Commentary.
1. Before NITA, "there was no nationally recognized, coherent methodology for teaching
trial advocacy." Thomas F. Geraghty, Forward: Teaching Trial Advocacy in the 90s and
Beyond, 66 NOTM DAWM L REV. 687 (1991) (one of several articles in the Colloquium: Teaching
Trial Advocacy in the 90s and Beyond. A Critical Evaluation of Trial Advocacy Teaching
Methodologies and Designs for the Future).
2. Id. at 689; see also Kenneth S. Broun, Teaching Advocacy the NI.TA. Way, 63 A.B.A.
J. 1220 (1977). The NITA critique generally follows a specific set of parameters: (1) provide
a few good comments and a few negative comments; the participant cannot absorb much more;
(2) focus on specific examples from the performance for each comment; (3) then, provide specific
examples how that particular aspect of the performance could have been improved.
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The traditional teaching methodology has not been without its critics. 3
While the precise criticisms vary, they are common in their approach.
The critics, generally law professors, base their critiques on the perceived
differing needs of the two primary categories that implicitly define their
experience: law students versus law practitioners. These critics then
compare what they perceive students should be learning in law school
with what NITA offers. These critics find NITA lacking because it
fails to include in its critique or methodology an intellectual exploration
of theories of advocacy, and questioning of the legal system and the
lawyer's role.4 Furthermore, NITA provides insufficient attention,
considered by some to be even counterproductive, to ethical inquiry!
While to an extent the authors of this Commentary agree with this
criticism, a far more fundamental and useful basis exists to evaluate
skills training methodology.
6
This examination of advocacy teaching methodology begins by looking
at the underlying structure of learning. How can a course impart to
law students and beginning attorneys the methods and approaches that
experienced trial lawyers use?
II. Expert Versus Novice Thinking
Extensive inquiry led the authors of this Commentary to a contempo-
rary learning theory about how experts, as compared to novices, approach
problem solving. In teaching trial advocacy, we questioned how these
general theories could offer insight into how experienced attorneys
3. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, NITA and the University, 66 NOTRE DAME L, REV. 705
(1991); Geraghty, supra note 1, at 690-91; Kenney Hegland, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching
Trial Advocacy, 32 J. LEIAL EDuc. 69 (1982).
4. Geraghty, supra note 1, at 690-91.
5. Hegland, supra note 3, at 71.
6. We do not mean to minimize the other criticisms. As we discuss later, our course
conception has a strong ethical component. Moreover, since much of the course is discussion,
it also offers some opportunity to discuss lawyer roles and the system. An extensive exploration
of these topics, however, begins to move towards a separate course. See, e.g., J. Alexander
Tanford, What We Don't Teach in Trial Advocacy: A Proposed Course in Trial Law,. 41J.
LEGAL EDUC. 251 (1991).
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(experts), as compared to law students (novices), approached trials.
A methodology for teaching advocacy was formulated on this basis.
A. Schema Theory and Cognition
Contrary to prior beliefs that thinking processes function in direct
stimulus response chains (i.e., you see a chair in the external world and
think "chair" in your brain), current theory and research posits that
thinking is both active and creative.7 An illustration is helpful in order
to show how these processes operate in solving problems.
Imagine, for the moment, a simple problem that occurs in everyday
life. It is lunchtime and you are looking for a place to eat. Your
preference is to find a lunchtime cafe. How do you know when you
have found one? You will know when you have found your desired
type of restaurant because it will fit within a construct. This construct
is an interpretive framework, which forms the basis of what you perceive
as a lunchtime cafe. This construct consists of your past knowledge
and experience that totals your current conception of what a "lunchtime
cafe" looks like and how its occupants might behave. Contemporary
learning theory refers to this construct as a schema or schemata! Thus,
your schemata for this cafe problem will contain elements of a general
"restaurant" schema (e.g., how food is displayed, some form of service,
an area at which to eat, a mechanism for paying, etc.), as well as
subschemata-your concept of a "lunchtime cafe" (e.g., a sign in the
window with the words "cafe" or "luncheonette," booths or a counter,
7. See Richard C. Anderson, The Notion of Schemata and the Educational Enterprise:
General Discussion of the Conference, in SCHOOLING AND THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE
415,419 (Richard C. Anderson et al., 1977); see aLso JEAN PImEr, THm LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT
OF THE CHLD (1932).
8. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 7, at 419; David E. Rumelhart, Schemata: The Building
Blocks of Cognition, in THEORETIcAL ISSUES IN READING COMPREHENSION 33 (Rand J. Spiro
et aL eds, 1980); Robert Glaser, Education and Thinking the Role of Knowledge, 39 AM. PSYCHOL
93 (1984); John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty
Considers the Inplications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 275, 277-83 (1989).
The Schema theory has begun to appear in the legal literature in discussions ranging from
juror decision-making processes to the role of metaphor in legal reasoning. See Albert J. Moore,
Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L REV. 273 (1989); Steven
L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakesfor Law,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
1993]
HeinOnline  -- 16 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 823 1992-1993
AmERICAN JOURNAL Op TRIAL ADVOCACY
waiters or waitresses, a crowd filling the seats, etc.). These schemata
are simultaneously fluid and complex. The processes by which we use
these schemata are both active and creative.
Other than serving food on the premises, no single set of characteristics
necessarily constitutes a restaurant. Although one can recognize a
restaurant, one is also able to distinguish a formal restaurant from an
informal diner, or a Chinese restaurant from a pizza parlor. This illu-
strates the active aspect of the thinking process using schemata. Thus,
if one were to look for a lunchtime cafe, one would subconsciously
take his schemata for lunchtime cafes onto the street and actively use
it both to locate data, and to test the hypothesis that a particular set
of data constitutes a lunchtime cafe. By using the schemata for locating
such a cafe, the schemata would increasingly focus on additional relevant
data.9
For example, if one encountered a neon sign announcing "Cafe" over
a doorway, this would be consistent with the hypothesis. One would
assume that he had found a cafe. But sometimes the schemata will
lead to a false path. For instance, suppose one were to walk into a place
that had a sign over the doorway that said, "Good Eats," and the entry
room was decorated with a few neon art signs, electrically lit up, glowing
and blinking ("cafe," "good eating," "best buys in town," etc.). Imagine
further freestanding booths and counters of every description along one
wall, and some people standing and others walking around. One would
begin to rethink the meaning of his schema and his originally desired
conclusion. One would be correct in thinking this cafe is not an open,
operating lunchtime cafe despite its cafe characteristics. "What could
it be?" one might ask. One might conclude it was a restaurant supply
house (the signs, booths and counters in rows, people standing and sitting,
but no food). But if a further investigation of the cafe revealed customers,
steaming food on the tables, waiters carrying trays, and a man behind
a cash register, one would conclude that the original hypothesis-that
this is a lunchtime cafe-had been confirmed. But could this scenario
also be a movie set?
Again, one would need to delve further into his general restaurant
schema and specific lunchtime cafe schema to decide if his latest
9. See Rumelhart, supra note 8, at 37-38, 41-45.
[VoL 16:821
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hypothesis, "it is a movie set," was correct. Probing additional data
from one's schemata, one might find that the movie set conclusion is
highly unlikely if the establishment is located on a street filled with
eateries and other businesses but no cameras or special lighting can
be seen. Thus, one is actively processing both information and symbols
by using the general and subschemata he had about restaurants, businesses,
and lunchtime cafes. Naturally, the only real confirmation that the
schemata and hypothesis match is to enter the establishment, sit down,
order and eat a meal and pay for it.
Thinking also may be creative. Once data is filtered through one's
own schemata and a hypothesis is confirmed, things are perceived that
literally do not appear from surface information received from the
immediately perceived data.10 For a moment, revisit the cafe example.
Suppose you sit at a booth in the cafe. Nothing is on the surface of
the table and a food menu does not appear on the walls. Nevertheless,
you expect to see silverware, dishes, water brought to the booth, a waitress
to appear with a menu, and a bill to be presented at the conclusion of
the meal. This is what it means to have a "lunchtime cafe" schemata.
Likewise, experts possess highly developed schemata." These
schemata function precisely as the cafe illustration. An expert may
face a problem-solving situation with vast amounts of specialized
knowledge and experience. The expert's information is organized within
an interpretive fiamework facilitating use of that information for purposes
of solving problems within that particular expertise area?2 With such
schemata, the expert will be able to: (1) begin developing issues (which
in other disciplines is called problem representations), (2) apply broad
principles to the problem by referring to schemata that identifies informa-
tion for use, (3) recognize sub-problems and possibilities that do not
appear in the surface elements of the problem, and (4) develop lines
of argumentation to support the conclusions?13
10. See Mitchell, supra note 8, at 277.
11. See Glaser, supra note 8, at 98-99.
12. Id.
13. This is based on studies reported in James F. Voss et al., Problem-solving Skill in
the Social Sciences, in 17 PSYCHOL OF EARNIo & MOTIVATION 165, 191-212 (1983); see
also Mitchell, supra note 8, at 279-80.
1993]
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In contrast, the novice will tend to view and to respond to information
as fragmented bits of facts, not through lack of intelligence but for want
of the expert's schemata.14 For instance, imagine a novice who has
no general schemata for restaurants or lunchtime cafes.s The informa-
tion and symbols encountered (a counter, booths, etc.) are therefore
bits and pieces of random information. This contrast between novice
and expert is also applicable in the legal world.
B. The Experienced Advocate's Schemata in Action
Experienced trial advocates are experts whose highly developed
schemata enables them to use thought processes quite different from
those of novices (law students and beginning attorneys). Expert problem
solving in the area of trial advocacy is distinguished from novice problem
solving in the same way as it is in other disciplines.1 6 Again a brief
illustration will elucidate this point.
14. Voss, supra note 13, at 191-212; see also Glaser, supra note 8, at 98-99.
15. C. MARY NL MoRRiS, A DANGmtOUS WOMAN 186 (1991). The author gives a powerful
fictional exploration of the painful inner life of a young woman who does not possess a set
of schemata adequate to make conventional sense of the common experiences of daily life.
On the fifth floor, she pretended to look at cosmetic bags while she tried to work up
the courage to go into the beauty salon. She kept glancing at the pink doors. She
didn't know what to do once she got inside, go sit in a chair or wait for someone to
help her. She didn't even know what to tell them about her hair. Her father had always
cut it. In the last few months, she had tried to trim it herself, but it always came out
uneven.
Id.
16. The authors propose that the schemata of expert litigators will be composed of a vast
knowledge base, including: substantive law; evidentiary rules; common fact patterns that are
associated with particular allegations and defenses; rhetorical moves; local conventions and
procedures (written and unwritten); techniques for laying evidentiary foundations; overall
approaches to the various performance skills (direct examination, closing argument, etc.); effective
sequences for particular examination situations (e.g., cross-examining the informant); likely
reactions of (particular) judges, opposing counsel, and witnesses to various tactics; approaches
to ethical issues; range of acceptable behavior in court; where particular evidence is likely
to be stored/found for investigation and discovery, analogies; lines of argumentation for various
specific situations (e.g., how to argue damages, burdens of proof); method for organizing
information at trial; patterns for analyzing a case; and knowledge about a particular area of
expertise (e.g., economics, fingerprints).
[Vol 16:821
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Imagine a client accused of burglary who visits an attorney's office
and says, "I told you before that they've got the wrong guy. A guy
that looks like me, Fred, really did it. Well, I just talked to Fred and
he said he's willing to tell that to a jury. It's his first beef, so he's not
facing much, while I'm facing heavy time with all my priors."
Focusing on the most salient feature of this information-that Fred
will take the rap-a novice attorney will likely respond, "Great Bring
him in." At the same time, the novice attorney probably will think to
himself, "If Fred says what my client indicates, the case is over."
An experienced attorney, however, will immediately realize that a
myriad of possibilities and actions exist that do not appear on the surface
of the dialogue. An experienced attorney might imagine several different
scenarios. First, assuming that Fred will show up (the experienced attor-
ney will tend to be skeptical that he will), serious ethical issues might
exist with which the lawyer will have to deal. The experienced attorney
will keep the ethical issues in mind and then think of a course of action
that would make clear that she does not represent Fred."'
The lawyer would also recognize a potential second course of action:
Should she, the attorney, also tell Fred that he should see a lawyer before
talking to her? s This second possibility raises several additional
questions and courses of action that the experienced attorney usually
envisions. For instance, what if she suggests to her client that they "turn
Fred over" in exchange for a deal? (Although if her client has the more
serious record of the two, this strategy will be less viable). Or suppose
she intends on getting a statement from Fred to be used in court in the
event that he subsequently fails to appear at trial, or takes the stand
and fails to incriminate himself, or gets on the stand and pleads the
Fifth Amendment? What, if any, are the attorney's obligations to Fred
in preparing for each of these eventualities?
As the potential scenarios unfold, the experienced attorney will also
see that moral dimensions exist to her actions. For instance, if the
attorney turns Fred over in exchange for a deal, the attorney must decide
17. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSioNAL CoNDuer Rule 4.3 (1992) (dealing with
unrepresented person).
18. Cf. "During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not
give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain counsel" MODEL RULES
OF PROFmSSIONAL CoNDUcr Rule 4.3 crmt. (1992).
19931
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what it means for herself and her practice to turn over other people to
benefit her client.
The decision to use Fred as a witness has both practical and legal
dimensions to it. Anticipating that Fred may not be willing to give
a written statement, the attorney will need someone other than herself
or the client as a credible witness who can be called to testify if need-
ed." But what if Fred says to the defendant client, "I only want to
talk to you (the defendant), no one else." Also, again, what if Fred
does not show up at trial? If so, his statement can not be used as a
prior inconsistent statement; it will have to qualify as a statement against
penal interest.2 Thus, the attorney will have to think about how to
take Fred's statement so as to strengthen the foundation for meeting
that exception to the hearsay rule. This dialogue only scratches the
surface of the experienced attorney's analysis.
Not yet considered are a host of other potential scenarios, responses,
and their legal and moral dimensions that might occur to the experienced
attorney. These include: (1) whether Fred would be believable to the
jury, (2) whether the prosecution can find information about Fred and
the defendant's relationship from which a jury could infer that Fred
would take the rap to protect the defendant, (3) whether counsel should
try to find an attorney to represent Fred who would likely have him
plead the Fifth Amendment if called to the stand, (4) whether the trial
judge would let Fred take the witness stand just to plead the Fifth
Amendment,' (5) whether a plausible motion could be made to grant
Fred immunity,22 (6) and whether Fred would have more impact pleading
the Fifth Amendment than testifying with immunity.
19. In general, an attorney cannot be a witness in the same case she is presenting. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.7 (1992) (addressing a lawyer as a witness).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1978) (sifting through
factual circumstances surrounding declarant's statement to determine its trustworthiness and
whether declarant could have reasonably believed that making the statement would have subjected
him to possible criminal liability). But see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct.
1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973) (allowing constitutional right to a fair trial to supersede a state's
restrictive hearsay rule against admission of statements against penal interest).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042,1046 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1976)
(stating that the defense had no right to put a witness on the stand "merely so that the jury
could see her assert her claim of privilege").
22. Cf. United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that it was
government misconduct to refuse to immunize defense witness who would contradict immunized
prosecution witness).
[Vol. 16:821
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C. Learning Theory and the
Limits of the Traditional Methodology
These illustrations are instructive for showing the dimensions that
are essential in applying learning theory-expert versus novice thinking-
to teaching advocacy. Obviously, even a live client clinical course would
have difficulty in imparting the knowledge base involved in the hypotheti-
cal case of Fred. How the professor can magically impart this type
of expert knowledge base (structured and stored so as to facilitate expert
problem solving) to a novice/law student, while teaching a simulation
course becomes increasingly difficult. Instruction soon becomes a lengthy
journey of hard work and continual study. Our focus has been on
selecting a teaching methodology which best moves that journey along
the appropriate path.
For an experienced attorney, the NITA-type approach is extremely
efficient and useful. Already possessing a broad conceptual organization
of their discipline, experienced attorneys can readily plug new bits of
information into their existing schemata. Novices, however, are in a
very different position. Novices do not have well developed schemata.
Novices operate on the level of seeing fragmented or surface level facts,
and usually those facts are dealt with haphazardly.
While a pure NITA experience will raise novices' self-confidence,
make them more comfortable on their feet, and impart various specific
trial techniques, novices more than likely will still tend to see the trial
process as a fragmented bundle of performance skills rather than as
a coherent strategic endeavor.' The individual, skill-oriented NITA
approach reinforces the novice's tendency to focus on the literal, concrete
elements of a problem. But novices need to learn how to strategize
and plan like trial lawyers, and not merely to mimic them. Students
23. Some clinicians who employ the NITA methodology would contend that we have
posited a straw man and that they have long since gone beyond classic NITA methodology.
While no doubt many individual teachers have moved beyond the classic NITA methodology,
based on our experience and understanding, most have not. Moreover, when the time arrives
when all have moved beyond such techniques, the value of this article's focus on the distinction
between expert-novice thinking and the use of the metaphor "Advocate's Mind" for structuring
an approach to skills training will remain. For more traditional criticism of NiTA-type
methodology, see sources cited supra note 3.
19931
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need to learn how to develop the overall conceptual structures that guide
experienced litigators.'
Merely supplementing the existing skills teaching approach is not
sufficient.' Rather, skills must be incorporated into a broader system
of teaching that focuses on developing expert schemata. Trial skills
are certainly an important part of a future litigator's training. But more
important is how an advocate thinks about these skills. These skills
are a function of what is termed the "Advocate's Mind."2' The next
section of this Commentary explores this concept, and shows how this
interpretive framework is a guide for teaching a course in trial advocacy.
ilL The "Advocate's Mind"
The Advocate's Mind is an interpretative framework for describing
the thought processes and the ethical perspective of the experienced
attorney. The experienced attorney is considered an advocate with a
well-developed schema.
Exceptional advocates excel in a common set of characteristics: (1)
preparation, (2) goal-orientation, (3) processors of information, and (4)
24. This was borne out when the authors observed a number of jury trials conducted by
clinical students. The students generally did not ask leading questions on direct examination,
but correctly used leading ones on cross examination. Additionally, the students knew and
executed the foundations for physical, documentary, and demonstrative evidence. Where they
stumbled as effective advocates had little to do with trial techniques. Rather, the weaknesses
they displayed were a function of not fully appreciating the interrelated inferences of the various
pieces of information in their case as these inferences bore upon potential narratives that could
have been told. Thus, the students were weakest on the broad, conceptual plane we generally
call Case Theory. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the most fascinating and
vivid direct examination is a failure if it does not contain all the information needed to present
the jury with the strongest story an advocate can put forth for her position. See sources cited
infra note 38.
25. In contrast, as Professor Geraghty notes, "[flor the most part these critiques [in the
Colloquium] recommend supplementation, and not an overhaul of the NITA method." Geraghty,
supra note 1, at 703.
26. The entire focus of our course is underlain by a constant attempt to faithfully replicate
the thought processes of the competent attorney. See MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL
ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYsIS, AND SAimOY (1988) [hereinafter PRETRJAL ADVOCACY];
MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY (1989)
[hereinafter TRIAL ADVOCACY].
[Vol. 16:821
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strategic planners.27 These characteristics form the optimal conception
of the lawyer's approach to advocacy while providing the underlying
framework for our methodology in teaching a course on advocacy. 2'
First, experienced lawyers often win cases before they walk into the
courtroom by virtue of thorough preparation. The perception that lawyers
are commonly viewed as individuals who are remarkably adroit at the
spontaneous skill of "thinking on your feet" is mistaken. Undoubtedly,
the courtroom performances of good advocates offer some tangible
demonstration of this skill. Yet, the absolute key to the success of every
lawyer is extensive planning and preparation. Often, this extensive
preparation is characterized by the attorney's bold disclosure that she
knows her opponent's argument better than her own.
Second, experienced lawyers are very goal-oriented, ends-means
thinkers. They are unlikely to look at a potential piece of information
in a case and ask in the abstract, as a law student might, "Is it admissi-
ble?" Instead, experienced trial lawyers will frame their inquiry as,
"Given the interest of my client in getting in or keeping out this piece
of evidence, what plausible arguments can I make to accomplish that
objective?"
Third, experienced lawyers tend not to think in terms of "facts."
Rather, lawyers think about facts as information that supports, harms,
or is neutral to their case. Thus, facts represent supportive information,
or a lack of information, or create inferences.2' Using a combination
of substantive evidence and rhetoric, experienced lawyers try to keep
out information harmful to their case, gain admission of that which is
helpful, draw and actively place a favorable gloss on the resulting
inferences, and wrap it up in a narrative that convinces the judge or
jury of their position. Thus, to trial lawyers, there is no such thing as
27. To literally describe the mental processes of the skilled advocate is obviously far beyond
our abilities. The nearly endless variety, complexity, and nuance of such minds dooms such
an enterprise from its inception.
28. These characteristics of mind would seem to constitute what Professor Lubet would
consider structural knowledge of the sort "from which other understandings, inquiries, and
theories will develop." Steven Lubet, Advocacy Education: The Case for Structural Knowledge,
66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 721, 727 (1991).
29. See Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation and Illustration of the
TrialAdvocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 611 (1987) (correlating the analysis
of evidentiary inferences in a particular case with actual case planning and preparation).
19931
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the "fact" of an eyewitness identification. Instead, they see a set of
information: A particular person (a witness), with particular perceptual
abilities and biases, who can put forth particular words from the witness
stand, about a particular event he or she claims to have perceived, under
particular circumstances.3s
In approaching this witness, opposing expert lawyers will attempt
to add, subtract, recombine, and recharacterize this information to support
the story they want the judge or jury to accept. For example, the
prosecution might attempt to create the tale of a vigilant citizen who
would never accuse an innocent man of a crime. The defense, on the
other hand might tell of a well-meaning citizen who was so frightened
by the event that his senses temporarily failed him. By seeing the world
as one in which information, lack of information, and inferences compose
the universe, the advocate is constantly watching what others would
call "reality" dissolve. The advocate then recreates that reality within
his own rhetorical framework.31
Fourth, experienced lawyers possess strategic plans-a case theory
and representational strategy-which guide all of their actions. They
simply do not view voir dire, depositions, cross-examinations, and witness
interviewing as a fragmented, unrelated series of skills performances.
Rather, each performing skill is guided by, and acts in service of, an
evolving case theory.3 This evolving case theory conjoins the determi-
native legal standards in the suit with an interrelated and supporting
factual narrative. On a broader scope, an advocate's entire client
representation is guided by an overarching "representational strategy."'
30. Professor Ordover makes an analogous observation: "What is the fact? It is that blend
of recollection, impression and opinion that a jury distills for a finding of fact based upon its
estimate of the probability of what occurred." Abraham P. Ordover, Teaching Sensitivity to
Facts, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 813, 816 (1991).
31. Professor Hyman captures much of this notion when discussing "invention." See Jonathan
M. Hyman, Discovery and Invention: The NITA Method in the Contracts Classroom, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 759, 773-75 (1991).
32. TRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 26, at 15-31; see, e.g., Edward . Imwinkelried, The
Development of Professional Judgment in Law School Litigation Courses: The Concepts of
Trial Theory and Theme, 39 VAND. L. REv. 59 (1986); Stephan A. Landsman, Satanic Cases:
A Means of Confronting the Law's Immorality, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 798 (1991);
Steven Lubet, The Trial as a Persuasive Story, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 77 (1990).
33. See PRELRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 26, at 7.
[Vol 16:821
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This representational strategy draws upon a range of problem-solving
tools available to the lawyer-litigation, negotiation, arbitration, moral
persuasion-as alternative or interrelated means for achieving the
particular client's ultimate objectives.
IV. The Course
A. Class Materials:
The Single Fact Pattern Approach
Putting into practice a methodology that focused on developing the
four characteristics of the advocate's mind required creating class
materials that supported and reinforced this approach. In constructing
these materials, these authors decided that using a single, complex ongoing
fact pattern (with both civil and criminal paths) was most effective for
developing the processes of how an experienced attorney thinks about
and develops a case. Centering the course on a single evolving narrative
takes the student from an initial client interview through trial. This
permitted accurate replication of the incremental access to information
over time that characterizes actual cases. After all, rarely does all the
information arrive at the same time. More importantly, this procedure
forced law students to constantly go through the core mental process
of evaluating and re-evaluating information in the context of refining
their case theories.
Furthermore, because the students spend a full academic year on
a single fact pattern, they are able to gain a relatively fluid command
of a complex factual scenario. This in turn bears a number of benefits.
Students learn in preparation for the future what really understanding
a case and thoroughly preparing for it looks and feels like. As the course
progresses, this method allows students to spend an increasingly larger
proportion of their time concentrating on thinking very hard about the
more sophisticated nuances of various aspects of the case,3 rather than
34. Professor Lubet in fact specifically recommends in his visionary "Law School Model"
that "[rather than rely upon short unitary problem, it will utilize case files that are nuanced,
complex, and detailed. The facts of the cases will be subject to continual reevaluation, and
the students will be required to work with the same files for weeks, if not months, in succession."
Lubet, supra note 28, at 733-34.
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employing preparation time in continuously becoming familiar with
new legal and factual scenarios.3 '
B. Classroom Phase I:
Developing the "Advocate's Mind"
To impart the four characteristics of the "advocate's mind," classes
should be conducted through the use of a somewhat different methodology
than what normally characterizes traditional NITA sessions. Up to one-
half of class time, however, should differ little from a typical NITA-type
workshop. That is, class time should emphasize the continued teaching
of technical skills, such as phrasing non-leading questions and employing
the litany for marking and introducing exhibits. The instructor should
also provide students with as many opportunities as possible to perform
and receive subsequent critiques.
On the other hand, at least one-half of class time should be spent
in discussion and exploration of strategic planning.3 Strategic planning
includes both planning the content of the specific skills performance
(the information that will be sought and presented) and planning the
actual skills performance (interview, witness examination, closing
argument). The sequence of questions that guides interaction with the
class, moreover, should be calculated to provide students with what
these authors term as "adversary patterns." These patterns are best
understood as articulated approximations of the almost intuitive way
experienced attorneys think about the litigation strategy of various aspects
of their case. Thus, when discussing the content of a particular direct
examination with the entire class or with the law student who will conduct
the exam, the instructors might go through something like the following
basic sequence. Note that the thought pattern in the following example
is applicable to any witness examination plan:
35. Year-end performances in mock trials based on different fact patterns convinced us
that the students had little difficulty transferring their skills to new fact situations.
36. Cf. Lubet, supra note 28, at 721. Professor Lubet would "deemphasize presentation
as an end... Students will be more successful not because they can speak well or argue
more persuasively, but rather because they can structure facts and law into a compelling and
theoretically sound case." Id. at 734 (footnote omitted).
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1. What information do you want to bring out?
2. Why, in terms of your case theory, do you want this information? (Alterna-
tively: How do you propose to use the information in closing?)
3. What evidence (admissibility) concerns do you have about each piece of
information?
a. How do you intend to meet these concerns?
b. What do you anticipate your adversary will do?
c. How will you deal with such a tactic(s)?
4. If you cannot get the information into evidence through this witness, what
will you do? (Alternatively: What are your "backups"?)
a. Do you have other sources for the information?
b. Do you have similar information which will serve as well?
c. Will you need to modify your factual narrative?
d. Will you need to modify/change your overall case theory?
e. Will you need to change your representational strategy (settle instead
of try the case)?
5. If you do get the information into evidence, is there any way your adversary,
or a juror in deliberation, can turn the information against you?
a. What will you do to "block" or at least mitigate this possibility?
b. Might you be better off not bringing in the information (if you have
that choice)?
6. Are there ethical issues with which you must deal?
The result of focusing on planning17 is that, approximately two-thirds
through the course, many students actually know what they are doing.
Students prepare for class so that they are capable of justifying each
question they plan to ask and each action they plan to take. Admittedly,
student performances, though generally competent, may not be as smooth
as those a more technique-oriented class might produce. More important-
ly, however, the majority of students appreciate the significance of the
various information in their cases.
The students understand that this information will be evaluated by
a jury in the form of a story.m The students also understand that their
main task is to control the formation of this story.3 In other words,
37. Similar patterns are also included in written problems. Spaces are provided after each
question in the pattern sequence for students to write their answers prior to class.
38. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETt & MARThA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALrrY
IN THE CouRiTROOM (1981); Moore, supra note 8, at273-78; see also Michael E. Tigar, Voices
Heard in Jury Argument: Litigation and the Law School Curriculum, 9 REv. LrrTG. 177 (1990).
39. See Moore, supra note 8, at 273-78; Lubet, supra note 32.
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the students learn how to win. In this respect, the authors are not
apologetic. Sometimes it seems that many instructors teaching advocacy
believe that underneath it all there is something slightly unseemly, even
ethically uncomfortable, about training students to win. Yet a glaring
ethical deficiency in the legal profession centers on just the opposite:
a common lack of understanding of what effectively trying a case is
all about. On the other hand, if the course ended at Phase I, one would
be hard pressed to answer the rhetorical question: "Aren't you just
training better Hessians?"
V. Classroom Phase II:
Appreciating the Ethical Implications
of the "Advocate's Mind"
Students cannot really grasp the ethical quandaries and responsibilities
that accompany advocacy until they come to understand how trial lawyers
think. Students will not understand these thought processes until they
understand the desire to win. In other words, students begin to understand
this mental process when, during the process of acquisition, it begins
to become a part of them.4"
Through this process the students experience seeing themselves utilize
this newfound ability to literally reconfigure reality through strategy,
evidence law, and rhetoric. As they begin to successfully use these
abilities, the students begin to appreciate the real sense of power imparted
by their newly acquired skills. The seduction of that power,42 the
genuine aesthetic enjoyment, and the satisfaction that accompanies using
40. In fact, it has been suggested that the successful advocate must possess the moral intuition
to appreciate the relative 'justice points" within each of the opposing positions. Anthony D'Amato,
Rethinking Legal Education, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 37 (1990).
41. Cf. Lubet, supra note 28, at 729. Professor Lubet relies upon student experience gained
from previous class exercises to provide a backdrop against which they are capable of evaluating
ethical dimensions of exercise near the end of term.
42. Professor Landsman deals with similar notions, "[The allure of worldly power or
acclaim often induces the sacrifice of fundamental principles. It will be my argument that
the temptation to abandon essential values is particularly serious for lawyers... ." Landsman
supra note 32, at 785. "[In order for a person to live a decent life he must recognize and
master the demon that society would make of him." Id. at 790.
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abilities well, becomes readily apparent.43 A prime example is a skillful
potter at the wheel putting his hand to wet clay. The sensation of creation
that the potter must experience is likely very similar to that experienced
by a skilled lawyer at various moments of preparing and molding a case.
At this Phase II point in the class, therefore, the instructor can begin
to delve into sophisticated ethical issues. Here, instructors can have
meaningful discussions with students concerning professionalism, such
as what type of lawyer they desire to become and how they will maintain
a sense of professionalism without sacrificing competence at the client's
expense. The instructor can also discuss micro-ethical issues such as
"coaching," and cross-examining the truthful witness. After all, these
are ethical quandaries that exist almost in direct proportion to the level
of skil and sophistication of the lawyer.
The instructor can also guide the students in facing and exploring
larger questions or macro-ethical issues. For example, the instructor
may explore the legal system implications of the existence of a relatively
limited group of attorneys who have highly-developed adversary abilities.
Once students experience the facility with which they can control and
manipulate information and outcomes even as neophytes, they wil fully
appreciate the systemic significance of the reality that, in all too many
cases, the relative skill of the attorneys, not the facts or law, is outcome
determinative. The students can also confront issues of how their
relationship with their client may be affected by the very mental processes
that make them superb advocates. Students can begin to perceive how,
over the course of the litigation process, the meaning of the clients'
lives may become separated and abstracted from them. The instructor
helps redefine the clients' lives by distilling all its aspects-loves, hopes,
failures, fear, nostalgia-into information, lack of information, and
inferences which are then rhetorically and legally manipulated into legal
categories and stories.
As illustration, a law professor recently gave a seminar presentation
on feminism and the legal academic profession. During the course of
her presentation, she discussed being denied tenure that led to a subse-
quently filed law suit. This law professor had a talented, sympathetic
attorney. She was ultimately successful in her suit and she did not even
43. Hegland, supra note 3, at 81.
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have to go to trial. Yet, she declared that participating in the litigation
process was one of the worst experiences of her life. Why? Because
from the moment the papers were filed, her life could no longer be lived
authentically. Literally every aspect of her behavior was reconceptualized
by her attorney (who then implicitly imparted this framework to her)
into the single element of whether it furthered or hindered her case.
Other than this single dimension, the law professor's life during the
litigation process had been drained of its meaning.
A final macro-issue that instructors usually raise with students is
the effect of developing the "advocate's mind." The poignancy of this
particular concern is starkly illustrated by a story from a friend and fellow
practitioner of the authors. The friend was a criminal defense attorney
working in an office with five other attorneys. Two of the attorneys
were representing a man accused of two counts of first-degree murder.
The prosecution's case turned on the testimony of the accused's seven-
teen-year-old former girlfriend. Several weeks before the scheduled
trial, this friend was summoned for an emergency office meeting by
the two attorneys representing the accused murderer. When all the
partners were present and seated, one of the attorneys began by simply
stating that the seventeen-year-old former girlfriend had been found
dead in an open field with a bullet in the back of her head. Without




and the Advocate's Mind
Starting and ending an examination on a strong point, and using
colorful language in examinations that reinforces a theme are excellent
communications techniques. But when the snowstorm rages, the novice
needs much more. The novice needs the far broader interpretative
framework that is reflected in the construct of the advocate's mind:
a schemata that will keep her focused. Having students mimic real
lawyers is fine as long as we recognize that most of what real lawyers
do is to plan and prepare for trial. The extensive preparation and planning
of a mock opening statement, for example, is what experienced lawyers
do most often. This process is exactly what trial advocacy courses should
strive to teach the students.
[VoL 16:821
HeinOnline  -- 16 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 838 1992-1993
